DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HQ AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTION CHECKLIST 33-1

15 September 2000

Communications and Information

MANAGEMENT OF TEMPEST INSPECTIONS IN AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (AIA) SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES (SCIF)

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This Checklist reflects the AIA requirement to adhere to national TEMPEST policy to protect communications from unauthorized agencies. For Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) SCIFs, there is an additional checklist in DOD 5105.21-M-1, Sensitive Compartmented Information Administrative Security Manual, appendix D.

1. This is the initial publication of AIACL 33-1. It establishes a baseline checklist for TEMPEST inspections of AIA SCIFs. Parts of this checklist will also be used by the Inspector General (HQ AIA/IG) during applicable assessments. Modify or add to each area as needed to ensure an effective and thorough review of the TEMPEST program. See attachment 1.

2. References have been provided for each item. All items are considered critical and are related to security, accountability, and, or mission accomplishment.

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Director Of Operations

Attachment 1

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION THE AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TEMPEST/ EMISSION SECURITY PROGRAM CHECKLIST

A1.1. This checklist is to be completed by the AIA unit's TEMPEST officer.

WARNING: If when filled out, a vulnerability is identified, the checklist is classified.

Table A1.1. Checklist for Communications And Information The Air Intelligence Agency Tempest/Emission Security Program Checklist.

SECTION 1: This section is applicable to the AIA unit TEMPEST officer. MISSION STATEMENT: To ensure an effective TEMPEST program for AIA units. REFERENCES: All references are to AIAI 33-203, The AIA TEMPEST/EMISSION Security Program unless otherwise noted. AFI 33-203, Emission Security, DCID 1/21, Implementation Manuel for Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, AFSSM 7011, Emission Security Countermeasures Review (to be replaced by AFI 33-214 Vol II), NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, (FOUO) RED/BLACK Installation Guidance, NSTISSI No. 7003, Protected Distribution System (PDS).			
1.0 CRITICAL ITEMS:	YES	NO	N/A
1.1. Is the unit TEMPEST officer appointment letter on file? (3.1 and AFI 33-203)			
1.2. Has the TEMPEST officer been trained? (3.2.3 and AFI 33-203, para 12.6.2)			
1.3. Is there a TEMPEST reference library on file? (3.2.2)			
1.4. Is there a copy of the M-1, TEMPEST Addendum, Appendix J and, or a copy of the Inspectable Space Determination on file? (3.2.8 and DCID 1/21, para 2.3.3)			
1.5. Has the TEMPEST officer obtained approval to use the items listed in AIAI 33-203, para 3.2.7. from the applicable SCIF Approval Authority? (3.2.7)			
1.6. Has the TEMPEST officer completed a TEMPEST RED/ BLACK inspection within the last year and is the report on file? (3.2.8; DCID 1/21, para 2.3.3)			

WARNING: If when filled out, a vulnerability is identified, the checklist is classified.

Table A1.2. Checklist for Administrative work areas within an AIA SCIF.

SECTION 2. This section is applicable to administrative work areas within an AIA SCIF. MISSION STATEMENT: To ensure an effective TEMPEST program for AIA units. REFERENCES: All references are to AIAI 33-203 unless otherwise noted.			
2.0 CRITICAL ITEMS:	YES	NO	N/A
2.1. Do RED and BLACK processors have sufficient separation? (A2.6, NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, section 3)			
2.2. Is the TAD approved and installed in accordance applicable instructions? (A12.2 and DCID 1/21,Annex G, 6.6)			
2.3. Has all dual mode facsimiles been approved by the SCIF Approval Authority? (DIA/NSA). (3.2.7)			
2.4. If a STU III is hooked to a RED processor and is not installed with a shielded cable, is it installed as a RED processor? (NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, para 5.5)			
2.5. Does the incoming commercial TV cable have an isolator? (NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, 4.9.6)			
2.6. Are the commercial televisions installed as a BLACK system? (NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95, Section 3)			
2.7. Has the Approval Authority (DIA/NSA) accredited the television system? (3.2.7)			
2.8. Is the record feature on any personally owned audio or video equipment disabled/removed? (DCID 1/21, Annex D)			
2.9. Are all two-way transmitting and recording equipment for official use only? (DCID 1/21, Annex D)			
2.10. Are all pagers or beepers receive only? (DCID 1/21, Annex D)			
2.11. Are all cables marked and labeled in accordance with AIAH 33-102, Attachment 1, drawing no. 99-01-024? (A2.4 and DCID 1/21, Annex G, 6.2)			

WARNING: If when filled out, a vulnerability is identified, the checklist is classified.

Table A1.3. Checklist for AIA unit TEMPEST Manager.

SECTION 3. This section will be completed by the AIA unit's TEMPEST manager or functional managers whenever a new system is installed or to satisfy the annual RED/BLACK inspection report. The checklist is applicable to computer centers, communication centers, and mission areas. MISSION STATEMENT: To ensure an effective TEMPEST program for AIA units. REFERENCES: All references are to NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 unless otherwise noted.			
3.0 CRITICAL ITEMS:	YES	NO	N/A
3.1. Signal Cables			

3.1.1. Are all RED cables separated from BLACK processors by the distance specified in section 3? (Section 3 and AIAI 33-203, A2.6.2)			
3.1.2. Are all BLACK cables separated from RED processors by the distance specified in section 3? (Section 3 and AIAI 33-203, A2.6.2)			
3.1.3. Are all metallic and fiber optic cables clearly marked, labeled, or tagged to maintain accountability? (DCID 1/21 Annex G.6.2 and AIAI 33-203, A2.4)			
3.1.4. Do all RED cables (signal, clock, control) have, as a minimum, one overall nonferrous metallic shield and outer insulating sheath? (6.8)			
3.1.5. Is each signal, clock, and control ground return a separate conductor not common to shields? (4.4 and 6.8)			
3.1.6. Do all BLACK cables (signal, clock, control) have, as a minimum, one overall nonferrous metallic shield and outer insulating sheath? (4.4 and AIAI 33-203, A2.3)			
3.1.7. Are the shields for each RED and BLACK cable a continuous low impedance run to ground whose integrity is maintained by proper termination of all joints and splices? (4.4.1)			
3.1.8. Have all unused cables and conduit been removed? (DCID 1/21, Annex G6.2 and AIAI 33-203, A2.3.6)			
3.2. Signal Distribution			
3.2.1. Does the signal distribution system provide for proper routing of RED and BLACK cables? (4.5)			
3.2.2. Do BLACK wire lines exiting the IS maintain the appropriate distance from any RED processor? (Section 3)			
3.2.3. Do all RED and BLACK wireways maintain the appropriate separation? (Section 3)			
3.2.4. Is there a separate distribution system for SCI circuits? (6.4)			
3.2.5. Are there separate patch panels for SCI circuits? (6.4)			
3.2.6. Do all RED and BLACK wire line patch facilities have the appropriate separation? (Section 3 and 6.5)			
3.2.7. Do all RED and BLACK distribution patch panel have incompatible connectors or some method to prevent inadvertent RED to BLACK patching? (4.5.2)			
3.2.8. Are all unencrypted SCI cables totally contained within the SCI area? (6.2)			
3.3. Signal Line Filters and Isolation Devices			
3.3.1. Are filters installed on signal lines that egress the SCIF where required by the ISD or a CTTA? (ISD)			

3.3.2. Are non-associated signal lines, distribution system ducts, extraneous conduit, pipes for steam or water, air conditioning ducts, etc., which egress the IS decoupled at the point of egress if required by the ISD? (ISD)			
3.4. Power Distribution			
3.4.1. If the average power load is less then 100 KVA, has a CTTA determined a need for a power filter or conditioned power? (Section 3 and ISD)			
3.4.2. Is filtered power used only for RED processors? (4.7.1)			
3.5. Grounding System			
3.5.1. Has the external grounding system been checked by the BCE within the last 21 months? (AIAI 33-203, A10)			
3.5.2. Have the internal ground plates been checked within the last 21 months? (AIAI 33-203, A10)			
3.5.3. Is there a record of the ground checks? (AIAI 33-203, A10)			
3.5.4. Are all spare conductors and shields terminated to the appropriate ground bus? (4.4.1 and DCID 1/21,Annex G6.2)			
3.5.5. Is the grounding system composed of an earth electrode subsystem, lightning protection subsystem, fault protection subsystem, and signal reference subsystem? (4.8)			
3.6. Administrative Equipment			
3.6.1. Are all administrative telephone instruments at least 2 meters from the mission floor, computer floor, or communications area? (AIAI 33-203, A5.2.3)			
3.6.2. Are all administrative telephone signal lines installed in accordance with the separation guidance found in NSTISSAM TEMPEST/2-95 as determined by their ISD? (Section 3 and AIAI 33-203, A5)			
3.6.3. Is the speaker and microphone on speakerphones disabled or approved by the SCIF Approval Authority (DIA/NSA). (DCID 1/21, G.6.5.2)			
3.6.4. Do all telephone signal lines use shielded cable? (6.8)			
3.6.5. Are all telephone lines entering a SCI facility filtered or optically isolated at the point of entry when required by the ISD? (ISD)			
3.6.6. Is each telephone wire accurately accounted for from the point of entry through labeling, log, or journal entry? (DCID 1/21, G.6.2)			
3.6.7. Are secure telephone instruments installed as BLACK processors? (Section 3 and 5.5)			
3.7. Radio Transmitters			

3.7.1. Are all radio transmitters located as far reasonable possible, but a minimum of three meters from any RED processors? (Section 3)			
3.7.2. Are all RF transmitters powered from different circuits from any RED processor? (Section 3)			
3.7.3. Is any BLACK power line connected to a RF transmitter at least one meter from any RED processor? (Section 3)			
3.7.4. Has the Approval Authority (DIA/NSA) accredited the system? (AIAI 33-203, 3.2.7)			
3.8. Protected Distribution Systems (PDS)			
3.8.1. Are all SCI and RED signal lines, grounds, etc., not located within the SCIF in a PDS? (6.2 and NSTISSI No. 7003)			
3.8.2. Do the portions of the PDS external to the SCIF conform to construction and surveillance requirements of NSTISSI No. 7003? (4.5.4)			
3.8.3. Has the Approval Authority (DIA/NSA) accredited the system? (6.2 and NTISSI No. 7003, section V)			